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In late December 2004 I traveled to India to witness the social ruptures that 
India’s entry into the modern intellecual property world would likely trigger. 
The deadline for developing nations to be fully compliant with the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs), the preeminent 
global intellecual property law of the Information Age, was January 1, 2005. 
From that date on, India would have Western-style intellecual property rights in 
everything from medicines to seeds. For more than a decade, the developing 
world had resisted this moment. Since they had been pressured into signing 
TRIPs during the Uruguay Round of WTO negotiations, countries such as 
Brazil and India had argued that strong intellecual property rights helped the 
West but would devastate the rest. 
Sadly, my visit to India that December bore witness to an all too literal 
tsunami that shook the Subcontinent. The tsunami focused the world’s attention 
on the rural poor in the countries at the perimeter of the Indian Ocean. I will 
seek to keep my focus on these people in this article. 
Much to my surprise, India rang in the New Year without much ill note of 
TRIPs. In the intellecual property storm, the dust had settled, for now. TRIPs 
was finally in India, seemingly to stay, and the intellecual property scholars and 
practitioners there with whom I spoke had little interest in prolonging the 
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battles of the last decade. “TRIPs has entered, and India took a U-turn because 
it felt it could not [continue fighting against TRIPs],” V.C. Vivekanandan, an 
intellecual property professor at NALSAR, a leading national law school in 
Hyderabad, told me. “It has been grudgingly accepted.”1 
But in that characteristically Indian way of absorbing every contradiction 
and all the diversity of life, this was not simply an expression of passive 
acceptance of destiny. After a decade of resisting the Western imposition of 
intellectual property, now many in India—from the intellecual property 
professors and lawyers in the cities to the farmers and artisans in the villages—
were beginning to ask: how can intellecual property rights work for them? 
TRIPs protected the knowledge and economic interests of the developed world, 
the rich corporations of the West. Can intellectual property be a tool for 
protecting poor people’s knowledge as well? Many seem to think so. Take the 
case of an award-winning farmer in Kerala who developed a high-yield method 
for planting rubber trees. An intellecual property professor from Kerala related 
the farmer’s story: “Later when somebody tried to plant [rubber trees] in the 
same way, [the farmer] said, ‘No, I will get a patent in this.’” The professor 
noted, “Five years back this concept [of patenting] was totally lacking. This 
farmer had only studied up to [the] sixth or seventh [grade]. But he has some 
idea about this particular law where you can stop somebody else from using the 
method.”2 
Certainly, the shift to appropriating intellectual property in India is neither 
complete nor uncontested. When the Kerala farmer took his claims to the 
Rubber Board, there was fierce debate among the farmers. “One young farmer 
stood up and said, ‘I [wouldn’t] want any monetary benefit from this. I [would] 
just want this to be propagated freely. Uncle, I [wouldn’t] want a patent. For me 
the honor of the award [would be] enough.’”3 But if the daily headlines are any 
indication, the country’s approach is shifting from this traditional view. The 
front pages chronicle a rising tide of applications filed with a national registry 
established pursuant to the Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and 
Protection) Act of 1999 (GI Act).4 Required by TRIPs5 originally as a means to 
protect French makers of wines and champagnes, the law gives trademark-like 
protection to distinctive goods or services whose quality and reputation derive 
from the geographical area in which they are produced. In a country such as 
India, which has a vast cultural heritage and a store of traditional knowledge 
dating back to the Vedas, the GI Act is seen as a potentially important source 
 
 1. Interview with V.C. Vivekanandan, Professor, Nalsar Univ. of Law, in Hyderabad, India (Dec. 
28, 2004). 
 2. Interview with V.K. Unni, Professor, Nalsar Univ. of Law, in Hyderabad, India (Dec. 30, 2004). 
 3. Id. 
 4. No. 48, Acts of Parliament, 1999 [hereinafter GI Act]. The GI Act became effective in 2003. Id. 
 5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, Arts. 22–24, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (2004) [hereinafter 
TRIPs]. 
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of recognition and income for India’s rural poor—the very same poor who 
otherwise have been displaced and forced further into poverty by globalization. 
One hope is that Geographical Indication (GI) protection will allow local 
artisans to stay in their communities and fend for themselves, without having to 
renounce their traditional work for life in the overcrowded cities. When I 
visited India in 2005, farmers and artisans from across the country were getting 
in line to register their wares, from Darjeeling tea to Alfonso mangoes, 
Kolhapuri cheppals, Mysore silk and sandalwood, and the uniquely woven 
sarees from the village of Pochampally in the shadow of high-tech Hyderabad.6 
The list of applicants for Indian GI status is growing. On my visit this past 
December, Madhubani paintings, which hang in my home in California, had 
been added to the queue. 
Turn the clock back ten years. When intellectual property had found its way 
into the sanctions regime of the international trade order, there were no 
marchers in the streets to mark the occasion. The White House issued a white 
paper declaring the need to strengthen intellecual property law in the face of 
the digital revolution. Congress was just about to undertake enormous 
giveaways to intellecual property holders—granting famous brands rights even 
in the absence of consumer confusion, extending copyright terms by another 
two decades, and securing technological copyright protection schemes against 
hacking. Courts signaled their willingness to accept patents on business 
methods. In the new economy of the information age, patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and even domain names7 were being distributed with abandon. 
Conventional wisdom was that the digital world to come would require bigger 
and stronger intellecual property rights. 
Amid this euphoria, James Boyle recognized a dark side of intellectual 
property. In this narrative of progress, Boyle saw us sowing the seeds of our 
own destruction. Just as the first enclosure of the commons and 
industrialization had threatened our natural environment, this new “land grab” 
in cyberspace and on our cultural commons, Boyle observed, threatened to ruin 
our cultural landscape and deplete our cultural heritage. Boyle’s critical insight 
was that expanding intellecual property rights were fed by the conceit of 
romantic authorship: the idea that individuals (and even corporations) create 
out of thin air rather than borrow from a rich public domain of freely circulating 
sources and inspirations. “The author vision blinds us to the importance of the 
commons—to the importance of the raw material from which information 
products are constructed,” he wrote in his 1996 book, Shamans, Software, and 
Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society.8 The process of 
 
 6. See Pochampally Paves the Way for Local IP Protection, ECON. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004. 
 7. See Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715 (2003) (discussing the 
allocation of property rights in Internet domain names). 
 8. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
INFORMATION SOCIETY xiv (1996). 
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creation, Boyle noted, requires the conservation of cultural raw materials; if 
these are themselves owned, the process of creation may be stunted. 
The rest is history. The book went on to become an intellecual property 
classic for our generation. Boyle’s vision of a political movement to protect and 
preserve the public domain, complete with private institutions dedicated to the 
project modeled after Greenpeace, spurred the establishment of the Creative 
Commons. On a personal level, reading the book in law school influenced my 
decision to become a law professor. 
Less noted but equally profound, the metaphor Boyle offered, “cultural 
environmentalism,” helped lay the foundation for the recognition and 
protection of traditional knowledge and natural resources found in the 
developing world. Taking a cue implicitly from the environmental justice 
movement, which demonstrated the disparate effects of environmental harms 
on disadvantaged minorities, the cultural-environmental movement illustrated 
how third-world peoples are disproportionately disadvantaged by intellecual 
property law, which historically has not recognized their cultural contributions. 
Indigenous people and those in the third world benefited from the attention to 
our cultural commons. It provided a moral and economic basis to reward their 
cultivation of the world’s biodiversity and ancient cultural knowledge about 
that biodiversity, both of which were required inputs for innovation. By 
“reifying the negative”9 and focusing needed attention on the “other side” of 
intellectual property,10 Boyle invented the public domain. 
But Boyle’s depiction suggests there are only two sides to the story. In fact, 
there are many views of the cathedral. Now, in the developing world, scholars, 
lawyers, and activists are turning the light on “poor people’s knowledge.”11 For 
them, this is “the other half of intellectual property”—the knowledge that is not 
protected by TRIPs, but perhaps should be.12 In this article, I consider how 
“cultural environmentalism” both bolsters and obstructs the project of 
protecting poor people’s knowledge and promoting development through 
intellectual property. I argue that although the metaphor spurred the invention 
of traditional knowledge as a political and legal category, the same metaphor 
may also obscure the inventiveness of traditional knowledge. Reifying the public 
domain may have the unintended effect of congealing traditional knowledge as 
“the opposite of property,”13 presenting poor people’s knowledge as the raw 
material of innovation—ancient, static, and natural—rather than as intellectual 
property—modern, dynamic, scientific, and cultural invention. Under this view, 
traditional knowledge holders may receive remuneration for conserving 
 
 9. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 69 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 10. See generally James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
1 (Winter/Spring 2003). 
 11. See generally POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004). 
 12. Id. at back cover. 
 13. Boyle, supra note 10, at 1. 
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biodiversity and contributing the raw materials of innovation, but they are not 
recognized as intellecual property holders in their own right. What’s more, a 
binary view of “intellectual property versus the public domain” rejects new 
claims for intellectual property in traditional knowledge on the premise that 
these rights would shrink the public domain.14 
In truth, the line between what law considers “raw material” versus 
“intellectual property” is less stable and more fraught with bias than the binary 
approach would acknowledge. While politically effective, reifying the negative 
may have the perverse effect of reinventing these categories as real and stable, 
obscuring the degree to which they are constructed and insecure. 
If anyone understands this, it is Boyle himself. He is, after all, the author of 
“Foucault in Cyberspace.”15 One of his fundamental concerns in Shamans, 
Software, and Spleens was with the contested concept of authorship. Why was 
the shaman’s lore unprotected “traditional knowledge” but W.R. Grace’s 
appropriation of that knowledge “innovation”? Why was Mr. Moore’s spleen 
“raw material” but the UCLA researchers’ cell line derived from the spleen 
“intellectual property”? These were more than the sharp questions of a law 
professor challenging first-year property students. Boyle offered up the 
“romantic author” not to justify these categories but to deconstruct them. Boyle 
persuasively argued the need to critically probe authorship and its premise of 
“transformative originality more often assumed than proved.”16 
How is it, then, that Boyle’s work may now be inadvertently helping to 
reconstruct some of the very same false binaries he set out to tear down more 
than a decade ago? The answer, I believe, turns on the historical contingency 
the work, its intellectual history. In Shamans, Software, and Spleens, Boyle was 
concerned about the morality of legally recognizing some members of society as 
authors and not others. He bemoaned the distributive effects of such intellecual 
property laws as “colossally unfair”17 and boldly called for “a critical social 
theory of the information society”18 that would consider these difficulties. But 
by and large, Boyle’s own work did not stray far from intellectual property’s 
economic tradition. While Boyle acknowledged the broad social, cultural, 
moral, and distributive effects of intellectual property, his primary prescriptions 
stuck to a law-and-economic analysis of intellectual property. Failure to protect 
a public domain was, above all, inefficient. Destroying the raw materials 
necessary for creation would stunt creation itself. This approach was admittedly 
strategic; Boyle openly stated that economic appeals “will sometimes convince 
 
 14. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Density & Conflict in International Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2007) (commenting that protections for geographical indications in the 
global South “may exacerbate an already troubling erosion of the public domain.”). 
 15. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, 66 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997). 
 16. BOYLE, supra note 8, at xii. 
 17. Id. at 142 (“If one has the slightest concern for distributional justice in one’s criteria for 
property regimes, this regime must surely fail.”). 
 18. Id. at xiv. 
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when more frankly moral appeals do not.”19 For all its paradigm shifting, in the 
end Boyle acknowledged that his approach was not radical, but rather that it 
evinced “a conservative strand,” advocating “a return to the rational roots of 
intellectual property.”20 
Boyle displayed a rare combination: postmodern acuity and political savvy. 
His analogy to the environmental movement was a brilliant move. But given the 
discursive restraints of the time, Boyle was not able to fulfill his ambition 
completely. He openly acknowledged “the dangers of embracing too closely a 
language that can express only some of the things that you care about.”21 A 
decade ago, Boyle was fully aware of the contingency of his own position, 
recognizing that “our concerns with education and the distribution of wealth, 
with free speech and universal access to information, can never be fully 
expressed in the language of neo-classical price theory.”22 
Today, thanks in large part to Boyle himself and to the prescient work of 
other intellecual property scholars, from Pamela Samuelson23 to Vandana 
Shiva24 to Lawrence Lessig,25 the space for discussing intellectual property’s 
distributive and social effects is expanding. Notably, a vast coalition of hundreds 
of intellecual property practitioners, scholars, and activists from around the 
world are calling for intellectual property to be approached in the context of 
broader societal interests and development-related concerns, and not just from 
the narrow lens of economic incentives for innovation.26 This symposium, 
 
 19. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 
87, 114 (1997). In SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS, Boyle wrote: 
Whether I am right or wrong about the distributional effects, I think it can be convincingly 
demonstrated that an exclusively author-centered regime will have negative effects on 
efficiency. In many ways, this may be the more important point to make. To condemn a 
system as unfair is one thing; to argue that it does not work, that it may sometimes actually 
impede innovation, is another. 
Supra note 8, at 127 (emphasis in original). 
 20. James Boyle, A Manifesto on WIPO and the Future of Intellectual Property, 2004 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 0009, 11, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2004DLTR0009.pdf. 
 21. BOYLE, supra note 8, at 114. 
 22. Id. at 115. 
 23. See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.01/white.paper_pr.html (criticizing the policy of the Clinton 
administration regarding intellectual property). 
 24. See generally VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 
(1997). 
 25. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE xiv (2004) (arguing that a combination of technology 
policy and copyright has transformed our “free culture” into a “permission culture” in which creators 
get to create only with the permission “of the powerful”). 
 26. See World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/ 
futureofwipodeclaration.html (writing that the expansion of intellecual property law’s mandate should 
be from an exclusive focus on “efficient protection” and “harmonization” to “fairness, development 
and innovation.”). The WIPO General Assembly responded to the call, voting that same month to 
incorporate a “development agenda” into its intellecual property law and policy. World Intellectual 
Property Organization, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development 
Agenda for WIPO, WO/GA/31/11, (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/ 
document/govbody/wo_gb_ga/pdf/wo_ga_31_11.pdf. The proposal was joined by a group of ten other 
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“Cultural Environmentalism @ 10,” is an opportunity for us to revisit Boyle’s 
work, to consider its continuing relevance in this new time and place. As ever, 
we are enriched by tradition, but not beholden to it. We are still in need of “a 
critical social theory of the information society” for which Boyle’s work offers a 
foundation. But since then, the discursive space for crafting that theory has 
expanded beyond the narrow confines of understanding intellecual property 
rights as incentives alone. 
In this article, I pay homage to Boyle’s innovation in my own way. Part II 
argues that by foregrounding the important role of “raw materials” in the 
process of innovation, cultural environmentalism helped provide a theoretical 
and political basis for recognition and recompense for the purveyors of those 
raw materials—often indigenous peoples who have cultivated the earth’s 
biodiversity and who hold “traditional knowledge” about that biodiversity. The 
invention of the public domain helped to foster “the invention of traditional 
knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy of rights. But while Boyle’s 
theory of the public domain provided intellectual heft to new claims for 
traditional knowledge protection, so, too, has it proved a stumbling block. 
Today, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)—and, more 
recently, the draft of a proposed Access to Knowledge Treaty (A2K)—promote 
an international legal regime that would reward traditional knowledge holders 
for their role in preserving biodiversity and ancient knowledge—that is, for 
their role in preserving the public domain. But these international legal 
documents do not expressly recognize the inventiveness of traditional 
knowledge, or the attendant intellecual property rights claimed by the world’s 
poor as authors and inventors of new knowledge. Part III argues that traditional 
knowledge is much more dynamic and innovative—indeed evolving—than the 
“environmentalism” metaphor, with its connotations of conservation, 
acknowledges. 
I explore the theoretical implications of this shift in understanding poor 
people’s knowledge in Part IV. I argue that a legal regime that recognizes poor 
people as agents—that is, as the subjects of intellectual property, and not just as 
the objects of intellectual property, offering up raw materials for others to 
transform—is premised upon a broader view of the relationship between 
intellectual property and development itself. Here, yet another side of 
intellectual property is revealed: its social and cultural face, not just the 
economic. World actors are beginning to recognize that intellectual property is 
about more than incentives for innovation. Just like real property rights, 
intellecual property rights can promote freedom and security, potentially 
 
countries, which called themselves the “Friends for Development.” World Intellectual Property 
Organization, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration of Issues Raised 
in Document WO/GA/31/11, IIM/1/4, (Apr. 11–13, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/ 
edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_1/iim_1_4.pdf [hereinafter Elaboration of Issues]. The countries were 
Bolivia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Iran, Kenya, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Venezuela. Id. 
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enabling knowledge societies in which the rich and poor alike may cultivate and 
materially benefit from their ideas. 
II 
WARDENS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The invention of the public domain helped lay a foundation for “the 
invention of traditional knowledge” as a political and legal category worthy of 
rights. Boyle’s metaphor for a politics of the public domain, “cultural 
environmentalism,” helped focus the world’s attention on the value of 
ecological and cultural biodiversity for the process of scientific and cultural 
innovation, and of the need to preserve those resources. Although Boyle 
offered cultural environmentalism as a metaphor, at points cultural 
environmentalism coincides with environmentalism itself. Recall the shamans of 
Madagascar. In this poverty-stricken nation, medicine men had developed 
therapeutic uses for the indigenously grown rosy periwinkle. Enter Eli Lilly & 
Company, which transformed this plant and the shaman’s lore into a drug to 
treat Hodgkin’s disease. At the time, the drug was valued at some $100 million 
annually.27 As Boyle pointed out, even a fraction of the company’s profits would 
have been a significant boost to the economy of this poor country.28 But through 
the vagaries of Western intellecual property law, the people of Madagascar 
received nothing of the profits derived from this new drug. Western intellectual 
property, as Boyle explained, was premised upon an authorial regime that 
“values the raw materials for the production of intellectual property at zero,” 
yet judges Eli Lilly’s contribution, refining the shaman’s traditional knowledge, 
in the hundreds of millions.29 
For Boyle, the rosy periwinkle symbolized more than just a moral problem, 
or a problem of postmodern authorship. The rosy periwinkle, Boyle wrote, 
“exemplifies the utilitarian failures of the current regime.”30 Absent any reward 
for their preservation of biodiversity and traditional knowledge, the people of 
Madagascar had “chopped down most of their forests to feed [their] people”31—
an irony Boyle decried. In this context, the cultural environment was not merely 
metaphor. Boyle was concerned about the literal environment, the earth’s 
forests and all of its abundant biodiversity, from which medicinal and other 
cultural knowledge could be derived. Cultural environmentalism called our 
attention to the traditional knowledge of the shaman and other people, often 
poor, who cultivated disease-resistant wheat and rice and held the secrets of 
which plants could cure our ills. Going further, cultural environmentalism 
 
 27. BOYLE, supra note 8, at 128. For other helpful analyses of the rosy periwinkle controversy see 
Shayana Kadidal, Plants, Poverty, and Pharmaceutical Patents, 103 YALE L.J. 223, 223 (1993); Srividhya 
Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 8 (2001). 
 28. BOYLE, supra note 8, at 128. 
 29. Id. at 126 (emphasis omitted). 
 30. Id. at 142 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 128. 
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highlighted the need to preserve diverse cultures, the repositories of such 
knowledge. “Who knows what other unique and potentially valuable plants 
disappear with the forest, what generations of pharmacological experience 
disappear as the indigenous culture is destroyed?” Boyle pointedly asked.32 
The trope of the romantic author obscured the contributions of biodiversity 
and traditional knowledge to innovation. “Who needs a public domain if you 
can create out of nothing?” Boyle asked.33 By exposing how companies such as 
Eli Lilly did not, in fact, create out of thin air, but rather often benefited from 
the rich biodiversity and knowledge found in the global South, Boyle made the 
strongest case for preserving the public domain: the public domain saves lives. 
Boyle’s theory of the public domain provided intellectual grounding to 
arguments for recognizing the value of the cultural contributions of indigenous 
and third-world peoples to innovation. Both the CBD—and, more recently, the 
draft of a proposed Access to Knowledge Treaty—promote an international 
legal regime that would reward indigenous peoples for supplying the raw 
materials of innovation and preserving the public domain. Employing the 
combined language of environmentalism and economics, the CBD refers to 
local peoples as “resource managers” and their trade as “species 
management,”34 and grants countries sovereign rights of ownership over genetic 
resources found within their borders. These rights serve as both ex post reward 
for biodiversity conservation and ex ante incentive for continued conservation. 
The CBD would grant both sovereignty in biological resources and the right to 
share in the benefits of patented products that arise from the appropriation of a 
country’s biodiversity or traditional knowledge. Similarly, a draft Treaty on 
Access to Knowledge seeks to “protect, preserve and enhance the public 
domain, which is essential for creativity and sustained innovation,”35 by similarly 
requiring patent holders to seek prior informed consent for use of biological 
materials from the country of origin and to “equitably share the benefits 
derived from use of that biological material.”36 The dual recommendation of 
both resource sovereignty and equitable benefit sharing seeks to recognize 
indigenous peoples as the wardens of the world’s “raw materials” and to benefit 
them materially for their role in preserving the public domain. 
Whereas this theory of the public domain has served to undergird claims for 
traditional knowledge protection, so too has it proved a stumbling block.  In the 
 
 32. Id. at 128–29. 
 33. Boyle, supra note 9, at 52. 
 34. DARRELL A. POSEY, INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ETHICS: A DARRELL POSEY READER 
161 (Kristina Plenderleith ed., 2004); see also Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 22, U.N. DOC A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 
1992) (“Indigenous peoples and their communities, and other local communities, have a vital role in 
environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. 
States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture, and interests and enable their effective 
participation in the achievement of sustainable development.”). 
 35. TREATY ON ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, pt. 1, Preamble (draft, May 9, 2005), available at 
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf. 
 36. Id. at art. 4(1)(b)(iii). 
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last decade, we have seen indigenous peoples and the poor, not unlike the 
Kerala rubber-tree farmer, turning their attention to appropriating intellectual 
property to their own ends.37 Today, claims by indigenous people and the poor 
go beyond equitable benefit sharing; increasingly, the poor seek to own 
copyrights, trademarks, and patents in their own cultural and scientific 
innovations.38 Strikingly, the traditional advocates for preserving the public 
domain have flipped. “Native peoples once stood for the commons,”39 but with 
the imbalance of TRIPs being more and more apparent, advocates of the poor 
are turning their attention to securing affirmative intellecual property rights for 
their own cultural and scientific innovations. Paradoxically, however, the 
concepts of “traditional knowledge,” the “public domain,” and “cultural 
environmentalism” are now proving to be obstacles to understanding poor 
people’s knowledge as intellectual property. Claims by native peoples to hold 
intellectual property are resisted as threats to the public domain, or as the false 
consciousness of neo-liberalism, or as a radical assault on our intellecual 
property tradition, which encourages and promotes cultivation, not 
stewardship.40 
We should be wary of these declarations and “the romance of the public 
domain” itself.41 Anupam Chander and I have argued that, while the banner of 
the public domain is taken up for all of humanity, a binary view of “intellectual 
property versus the public domain” may not be to the benefit of the world’s 
poor.42 Often, we argued, the benefits of an open-access commons go to the 
richest and the strongest. Differences in wealth, gender, and class determine 
whether one will in fact be able to convert the riches of the commons into 
lucrative property. This is what we call the “romance of the commons: the belief 
that because a resource is open to all by force of law, it will indeed be equally 
exploited by all.”43 Concerns arising from efficiency alone obscure the disparate 
effects of the commons on the poor. Staying attuned to the distributional effects 
of the public domain, in contrast, may require thinking about poor people’s 
 
 37. See MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 55 (2003) (observing that many 
indigenous “lawyers and activists believe that intellectual property holds the key to heritage 
protection.”); see generally Madhavi Sunder, Property in Personhood, in RETHINKING 
COMMODIFICATION 164 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005). 
 38. See BROWN, supra note 37, at 43–68 (chronicling efforts by Australian aboriginals to assert 
collective copyright in Native designs); id. at 69–94 (describing efforts to use trademark and the right of 
publicity to combat perceived misuse of traditional symbols, such as the image of the revered Indian 
leader, Crazy Horse, on malt liquor); id. at 95–143 (noting indigenous responses to ethnobotany 
patents). 
 39. Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 
1331, 1335 (2004). 
 40. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 37, at 8 (“The readiness of some social critics to champion new 
forms of silencing and surveillance in the name of cultural protection should trouble anyone committed 
to the free exchange of ideas.”). 
 41. Chander & Sunder, supra note 39 (discussing how “the romance of the public domain” works 
to the detriment of poor communities). 
 42. Id. at 1335. 
 43. Id. at 1332. 
06__SUNDER.DOC 8/8/2007  9:21 AM 
Spring 2007] THE INVENTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 107 
knowledge in “uncommon property”44 terms, facilitating their capability to exert 
greater control over their property and to extract compensation from their 
knowledge. 
In this paper, I focus on the effects on the poor of the “cultural 
environmentalism” metaphor through its reification of the division between 
“raw” and “cooked” knowledge, a conceptual separation long fundamental to 
intellecual property law. Ironically, the cultural environmentalism metaphor has 
fortified the very boundary between authors and raw materials that Boyle 
himself had begun to tear down. Boyle pulled the rug out from under the 
romantic author, exposing the equally important role of sources and audiences 
in the process of innovation. He also underlined the vagaries and cultural bias 
in intellecual property law’s determinations of who were authors and who (Mr. 
Moore) or what (his spleen) were the mere raw materials of scientific and 
cultural production. Boyle recognized the problem of “rewarding a narrow set 
of contributions to world culture and science.”45 But he stopped short of 
advocating reform of a Western intellecual property tradition founded upon 
naturalizing distinctions between nature and culture, idea and expression, raw 
material and innovation. Anchoring his argument in the orthodox language of 
efficiency, Boyle praised intellectual property’s tradition of striking the proper 
balance between intellectual property and the public domain but argued that 
the Information Age had upset that balance. Intellectual property could 
continue to promote innovation, he argued, if it returned to that balance.46 
Poor people benefited from this approach to the extent their contributions 
toward preserving the cultural environment were unrecognized in the past. At 
the same time, reifying the negative has the perverse effect of congealing poor 
people’s knowledge as the object of property, the raw material from which real 
intellectual property is derived, and obscures its status as the subject of 
property, deserving of the label intellectual property in its own right. 
Reflecting on “Cultural Environmentalism at 10,” we must consider how 
law’s reification of the negative invents tradition rather than discovers it. The 
lines between the inputs and outputs of innovation are anything but static. At 
the end of the last century, we witnessed the migration of many forms of 
knowledge from the public domain to intellectual property: university research, 
business methods, and even life forms were now in the realm of intellectual 
property. In truth, our intellecual property traditions are more complex than 
political campaigns for the public domain allow us to recognize. Viewed in this 
light, we may begin to see how the invention of traditional knowledge as 
perennially raw rather than cooked erects a false wall between modernity and 
tradition. Worse still, it deprives diverse peoples of the world of their humanity 
 
 44. Id. at 1354. 
 45. BOYLE, supra note 8, at 119. 
 46. See, e.g., id. at xiii (bemoaning intellecual property ownership by corporations that is “so 
expansive that they make it much harder for future independent creators to actually create”); id. at 142 
(citing “the utilitarian failures of the current regime.”). 
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and cultural creativity. As the Indian eco-feminist and property theorist 
Vandana Shiva describes, biodiversity is not simply the bounty “of nature, 
guided by nothing but Providence.” Far from it, “commons are resources 
shaped, managed and utilized through community control.”47 When law defines 
the contributions of the poor as nature rather than culture, the “creativity of 
both nature and other cultures is negated.”48 Boyle underlined “law and the 
construction of the Information Society.”49 Our understanding of information 
and knowledge is not preordained but involves political choices. Indeed, this is 
the insight of Shiva’s own political act of defining as “biopiracy” the “patent 
claims over biodiversity and indigenous knowledge that are based on the 
innovations, creativity and genius of the people of the Third World.”50 “Since a 
‘patent’ is given for invention,” she argues, “a biopiracy patent denies the 
innovation embodied in indigenous knowledge.”51 
I do not claim that our ability to distinguish the inputs and outputs of 
innovation is entirely indeterminate. Nor do I advocate law shifting 
continuously according to the changing political strength of either the rich or 
the poor in these matters. But I do call for legal decisionmakers to recognize 
contingency, bias, and unreasoned orthodoxy in the legal definitions that begin 
to appear—every decade or so—as natural. Today, we can see how constructing 
poor people’s knowledge as raw materials supports a model of “benefit 
sharing,” permitting local communities to perhaps receive some compensation 
from Western patents derived from those communities’ resources. But this 
approach rewards the poor only as wardens, not also as cultivators. In some 
cases, when the poor’s innovation is overlooked, benefit sharing may be “the 
equivalent of stealing a loaf of bread and then sharing the crumbs.”52 
 
 47. VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER?  UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 47 (2001). A quarter-century ago, William Cronon helped give birth to the environmental 
movement with a similar observation of the active role played by Native Americans in cultivating the 
New England environment, which colonists had deemed “natural.” “One must not exaggerate the 
differences between English and Indian agricultures,” Cronon wrote. WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN 
THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND 127 (1983). As Cronon 
explained, 
By making the arrival of the Europeans the center of our analysis, we run the risk of 
attributing all change to their agency, and none to the Indians. The implication is not only that 
the earlier world of “Indian” New England was somehow static but also that the Indians 
themselves were as passive and “natural” as the landscape. Id. at 164. 
 48. SHIVA, supra note 47, at 50. 
 49. This is the subtitle to Boyle’s Shamans, Software, and Spleens, supra note 8 (emphasis added). 
 50. SHIVA, supra note 47, at 49 (emphasis added). Shiva writes: “Terra nullius has its contemporary 
equivalent in ‘Bio-Nullius’—treating biodiversity knowledge as empty of prior creativity and prior 
rights, and hence available for ‘ownership’ through the claim to ‘invention.’” Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 64. 
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III 
CULTIVATORS OF KNOWLEDGE 
Today the poor seek to learn how to use the tools of intellectual property to 
recognize their own cultural and scientific contributions, not just those of the 
West.  Witness the invention of traditional knowledge: In Mysore, India, the 
makers of internationally famous silk sarees begin offering waterproof sarees. 
Inlaid marble designers in Agra, home of the Taj Mahal, who for years peddled 
“hackneyed tourist designs” to visitors now apply their craft to create “stunning 
dinnerware” to be served in the finest Indian and Western homes.53 Traditional 
people move, intermarry, share ideas, and modify their skills and products to 
the shifting demands of the market and their culture. These activities are not 
merely strategic and pragmatic, but are evidence of a healthy and dynamic 
culture. In short, traditional knowledge is more vibrant and innovative than the 
“environmentalism” metaphor, with its emphasis on conservation of nature’s 
raw materials, acknowledges. 
Debates over the protection of traditional knowledge, however, often fail to 
recognize its dynamic character. “Traditional knowledge” typically refers to 
knowledge handed down from generation to generation. This knowledge 
includes such forms of cultural expressions as songs, dance, stories, artworks, 
and crafts, as well as “symbols, marks, and other recurring expressions of 
traditional concepts.”54 Agricultural, scientific, and medical knowledge is also 
covered.55 It is often believed that this knowledge has existed for millennia and, 
remarkably, that it has remained static over time. We are told that proper 
authorship cannot be determined because the knowledge has passed through 
oral tradition and was not written down. Even if inscribed, we may not locate a 
single author; traditional knowledge is often communally held. Now mix in the 
historic conception of indigenous and third-world peoples as the anti-West: 
anti-commodification, anti-property, and anti-markets. The result is that, partly 
because of the difficulties of fitting poor people’s knowledge into western 
frameworks and partly because this knowledge is valued as the opposite of 
property, the wealth of creative knowledge and capacity for knowledge-creation 
of the poor is often overlooked. Instead, poor people’s concerns are addressed 
by stimulating technology transfer, foreign direct investment, access to Western 
knowledge, and, at best, equitable benefit-sharing. Much less attention is given 
to how law can tap the innovation and productive knowledge capacities of the 
poor. 
This is beginning to change. A recent World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) report on traditional knowledge finds that, in fact, “much 
 
 53. Maureen Leibl & Tirthankar Roy, Handmade in India: Traditional Craft Skills in a Changing 
World, in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES, supra note 11, at 53, 69. 
 54. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 11, at 1, 30. 
 55. Id. 
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[traditional knowledge] is not ancient or inert, but is a vital, dynamic part of the 
contemporary lives of many communities today.”56 This should not be 
surprising. Many of the most ancient monuments survived because they 
remained in use. Traditional knowledge techniques survive in this way, as well, 
not as static but as continuously evolving as humans innovate around them to 
meet current needs and solve contemporary problems. Nothing comes 
naturally. Knowledge requires constant human ingenuity to sustain it. 
Traditional knowledge, WIPO tells us, “is being created every day and evolves 
as individuals and communities respond to the challenges posed by their social 
environment. . . . This contemporary aspect is further justification for legal 
protection.”57 
Return to the example of Mysore silk sarees. The “grand old queen” of 
Indian silk58 has had a makeover since obtaining a geographical indication, 
updating its look with trendy new (but interestingly, natural) colors—“lilac, 
ecru, coffee-brown and elephant-grey”—and “contemporary” designs inspired 
by temple architecture and tribal jewelry.59 Make no mistake: tradition is hard 
work. As an executive producer of Mysore silk sarees explained, revamping the 
designs without losing the sheen of the silk took “months of painstaking 
research and trials.”60 
Consider another example, closer to home. A San Francisco-based artist 
trained in the modernist textile tradition of Ray Eames receives a felt rug from 
her Iranian-American husband, which he purchased in 1999 on his first trip 
back to Iran after the Revolution. The felt rug, the product of a 7000-year-old 
tradition, inspired the designer to apply her contemporary paintings to the rugs 
themselves—a collaboration across cultures and generations. This was an idea 
that the Internet and the Creative Commons could not assist. Indeed, the 
couple embarked on a four-year journey across Iran to learn more about felt 
rug making, to find that only a few living felters remain, sprawled all over that 
country and unconnected to one another. The couple put the felters in touch 
and established an Iranian factory employing the best of their techniques, 
literally reviving an art on the verge of extinction and creating a profitable 
market for the rugs, both within and beyond Iran.61 
Tradition is cultivated, not discovered. The concept of traditional 
knowledge, too, is a modern invention. Those studying poor people’s 
knowledge warn of the dangers of “overdrawing the distinction between 
 
 56. World Intellectual Property Organization, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 6, available at http://www.wipo.org/freepublications/en/tk/920/wipo_pub_920.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 57. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. Aruna Chandaraju, Modern MYSURU, THE HINDU, Mar. 3, 2005, available at  
http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/mp/2005/03/05/stories/2005030502400300.htm. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. For a more detailed account of the couple’s efforts see Peace Industry, 
http://www.peaceindustry.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007). 
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[traditional knowledge] and modern knowledge.”62 In truth, “no one’s life is 
entirely traditional, and no one’s life is entirely modern.”63 Indeed, forcing 
ourselves to see the modern aspects of traditional knowledge also helps us to 
view more critically our own romantic notions of western intellectual property 
as “new.” As Boyle demonstrated so well, the line separating the public domain 
and intellectual property does not often involve the eureka discovery that the 
trope of the romantic author suggests. 
Developing marketable uses for third-world cultural products is “ultimately 
perhaps the most effective way to protect their traditions.”64 Increasingly, third-
world artisans recognize that “[e]xcept in a museum setting, no traditional craft 
skill can be sustained unless it has a viable market.”65 And recent activity 
suggests that many third-world craftspeople and artisans are more market-
accepting than is generally acknowledged. We see again that commerce and 
culture are not necessarily at odds, as demonstrated by the revitalization of felt 
rug-making by the introduction of global markets: preservation through 
commercialization. And vehicles like geographical indications help preserve 
geographical diversity.66 Weavers, artisans, farmers, and the makers of 
handicrafts do not have to leave their skills or homes for city life. If properly 
tapped, trained, and protected, they can remain at home and participate in 
global industry simultaneously. 
Intellecual property rights in poor people’s knowledge are increasingly 
considered a key to third-world development—not just in the defensive sense of 
resisting TRIPs, but also in the offensive approach of writing rights into 
TRIPs.67 Partly, the development interest here is economic, although how much 
monetary value lies here is uncertain.68 Handicrafts alone were estimated to 
 
 62. Finger, supra note 54, at 31. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Liebl & Roy, supra note 53, at 70. 
 65. Id. at 67. 
 66. Pedro Echeverria, Letter to the Editor, FIN. TIMES, July 5, 2004, at 10 (“Better protecting 
geographical indications would allow for the localization of productions in the framework of trade 
globalization.”); see also Rosemary J. Coombe, Legal Claims to Culture in and Against the Market: 
Neoliberalism and the Global Proliferation of Meaningful Difference, 1 LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN. 35, 
46 (2005) (warning that geographical indications may be unduly used to limit competition and 
exacerbate existing inequalities within groups). 
 67. See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DISCUSSION PAPER, PROTECTING TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 2 (Jan. 2006) (“ICC supports initiatives to help holders of indigenous knowledge use the 
existing intellecual property system, including through education and studies of ways in which 
traditional knowledge can be protected by existing rights.”), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/intellectual_property/Statements/Protecting_Traditional_Knowledge.pdf; 
Liebl & Roy, supra note 53, at 56 (“The full potential of the role craft traditions can play in the 
development process, and specifically in the generation of income . . . has only recently begun to be 
appreciated.”). 
 68. Graham Dutfield argues that “estimating the full value of [traditional knowledge] in monetary 
terms is difficult if not impossible” because it “is often an essential component in the development of 
other products”; many products derived from traditional knowledge never enter modern markets and 
thus are not included in GNP calculations; the replacement cost of traditional knowledge would be 
“quite high”; and the spiritual value of some traditional knowledge cannot be quantified. GRAHAM 
DUTFIELD, DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTING TRADITIONAL 
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hold close to $3 billion annually in 2000.69 The U.N. estimates that developing 
countries lose about $5 billion in royalties annually from the unauthorized use 
of traditional knowledge.70 Poor people’s turn to property is surely about 
economics, but it is about social and cultural values, as well. These claims 
recognize that the relationship between intellectual property and development 
goes beyond GDP. People, rich and poor alike, want recognition of their 
creativity and their contributions to science and culture. This capacity for 
innovation, work, and cultural sharing is part of what makes us human. 
WIPO and TRIPs have focused on teaching the poor how to protect the 
intellectual property of the West. We need to turn our attention to helping the 
poor to use intellectual property to protect their own inventions, as well. Only 
some of the people who hold traditional knowledge oppose the 
commodification of their knowledge on religious or cultural grounds; but most 
are poor, lacking in the infrastructure for production, and are ignorant of 
intellecual property laws and commercial knowledge of marketing and 
branding. Intellectual property ownership does not come naturally. 
In many cases . . . poor people’s knowledge meets the standard of novelty that modern 
IP law demands. . . . The development dimension lies in helping poor people to master 
the commercial/legal tools needed to collect the value of their novelty. This is about 
entrepreneurship, about finding clever ways to repackage traditional knowledge into 
products useful for consumers in mass markets, and about developing the capacity to 
produce and deliver these products in sufficient quantity and quality as to satisfy such 
markets.71 
 
KNOWLEDGE: A REVIEW OF EXPERIENCES IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2000). 
Compare Graham Dutfield, Legal and Economic Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, in 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 495, 504–05 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) 
(suggesting that “the global value added to rice yields by use of [Indian] landraces can be estimated at 
$400 million per year”) with Stephen B. Brush, Farmers’ Rights and Protection of Traditional 
Agricultural Knowledge 17 (Int’l Food Policy Research Inst., Working Paper No. 36) (noting there is 
“no estimate of value or widely accepted method to estimate the value of crop genetic resources 
developed by farmers”). 
 69. Liebl & Roy, supra note 53, at 54 (“Crafts show tremendous potential in terms of employment 
generation and poverty alleviation in India. Handicrafts provide a livelihood, albeit modest, to large 
numbers of poor people in India, and especially to the rural poor.”). A recent United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) symposium concluded, for example, 
“the industries of the imagination, content, knowledge, innovation and creation clearly are the 
industries of the future . . . they are also important contributory factors to employment and economic 
growth.” Id. at 53. 
 70. Coenraad J. Visser, Making Intellectual Property Laws Work for Traditional Knowledge, in 
POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 
supra note 11, at 213. But the turn to intellectual property for the poor is not simply another instance of 
a misguided, “if value, then right” mentality. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 
405 (1990). As I argue in Part IV, infra, dismissing these claims on such grounds obscures the ways in 
which poor people’s intellecual property claims present a broader understanding of the purposes and 
effects of intellecual property law, beyond traditional renderings of intellectual property as incentives 
alone. 
 71. Finger, supra note 54, at 35 (emphasis added). 
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Increasingly, indigenous people and those in the third world seek “training on 
IP tools and how to use them.”72 The new Indian Geographical Indication Act 
offers an example. When the Act became effective in 2003, few were aware of 
its implications. NGOs thus embarked on extensive campaigns to educate local 
farmers and artisans about GIs.73 
TRIPs offers a foundation for international recognition of GIs. It defines 
GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a 
Member . . . where a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the 
good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin.”74 “Champagne,” 
“Tequila,” and “Roquefort” present examples of the types of goods recognized 
as GIs. Under TRIPs, member states must provide legal means to prevent uses 
of a designated GI that either mislead the public as to the geographical origin of 
the good or  constitute “unfair competition” under Article 10bis of the Paris 
Convention.75 In addition, TRIPs Article 23 mandates that further protection be 
extended to GIs for “wines and spirits,”76 which must be protected even in the 
absence of consumer confusion.77 
Two-tiered protection—a higher level of protection for wines and spirits and 
a lower one for everything else—has been a source of continuing conflict 
between Europe and the developing world.78 Partly, this is because of a 
perceived inequity in the current TRIPs system, and partly it is because GIs are 
considered to be where much of the wealth of poor people lies: in local 
production methods and cultural goods, from Darjeeling tea to Mysore silk to 
 
 72. Id. at 19. 
 73. See Jasper Vikas George, Geographical Indications and India, Apr. 3, 2005, 
http://india.indymedia.org/en/2005/03/210197.shtml (urging Indians to seek GI protection of traditional 
knowledge). 
 74. TRIPs, supra note 5, at art. 22(1). 
 75. Id. at art. 22(2). 
 76. Id. at art. 23. 
 77. Id. at art. 23(1) (prohibiting use of the GI when the product does not originate “in the place 
indicated by the geographical indication . . . even where the true origin of the goods is indicated or the 
geographical indication is used in translation or accompanied by expressions such as ‘kind,’ ‘type,’ 
‘style,’ ‘imitation’ or the like.”). The designation “Napa Valley Champagne,” for example, even when 
truthful as to the indication of the product’s origin, would be impermissible under the heightened level 
of protection mandated by TRIPs for wines and spirits. 
 78. A handful of India’s submissions in the WTO relating to TRIPs since 2000 show this. See, e.g., 
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Bulgaria, 
Cuba, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, the European Communities and Their Member States, Georgia, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Romania, The Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey, IP/C/W/353 (June 24, 2002) (focusing 
on “protecting all geographical indications equally”); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, Iceland, India, Jamaica, 
Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and 
Venezuela, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 (May 17, 2001) (“The TRIPS Agreement does not provide sufficient 
protection for geographical indications of products other than wines and spirits.”); Council for Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from India IP/C/W/196 (July 12, 2000) 
(proposing that “additional protection for geographical indications must be extended for products 
other than wines and spirits”). 
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basmati rice.79 The patent provisions of TRIPs have posed clear challenges for 
developing countries, which typically lack capital for R&D-intensive 
breakthroughs or manufacturing capacity. GIs, in contrast, are hailed as the 
poor people’s intellecual property rights, recognizing the knowledge of weavers, 
farmers, and craftspeople rather than just the high-technology contributions of 
multi-national corporations.80 The structure of GIs does make them particularly 
suited to poor people’s knowledge. First, GIs recognize collective intellecual 
property rights; under the Indian GI Act, multiple associations of artisans may 
be recognized as the authorized producers or users of a GI.81 GI applications are 
also relatively cheap, at least for a group of artisans working together. Under 
the GI Act, it costs a modest 5000 rupees to apply (little more than $100).82 
Although GIs certainly hold promise for the poor, they have limits. The 
Indian GI Act protects only those goods or processes whose quality or 
reputation are shown to be “due exclusively or essentially to the geographical 
environment, with its inherent natural and human factors.”83 GI applications 
require “proof of origin” and a “historical record”84 of continuous use of the 
goods or process. Registrants obtain the exclusive right to use the GI,85 and 
licensing of GIs is prohibited.86 
Such requirements and restrictions take a narrow view of traditional 
knowledge, linking culture to land. The rule against alienability poses special 
concerns. Even if this approach may enable people to remain within their 
communities (and preserve the physical environment, as well), what if they 
 
 79. GI status for basmati rice is controversial because its production is not limited to any particular 
geographical region in India. Country-wide recognition may also qualify, however. The European 
Patent and Trademark Office, for example, recently upheld Greece’s GI in feta cheese after a decade-
long battle with other European countries. Stéphanie Bodon, The EU Feta Debate Concludes, 
MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MIP WEEK, Oct. 31, 2005, available at 
http://www.managingip.com/?Page=9&PUBID=198&ISS=20643&SID=594780&SM=&SearchStr=GI. 
 80. This section is adopted from a larger, related paper, Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
257 (2006). 
 81. The Indian GI Act defines “geographical indication” in relation to goods as 
an indication which identifies such goods as agricultural goods, natural goods or manufactured 
goods as originating, or manufactured in the territory of a country, or a region or locality in 
that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of such goods is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin and in case where such goods are 
manufactured goods one of the activities of either the production or of processing or 
preparation of the goods concerned takes place in such territory, region or locality, as the case 
may be. 
Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act of 1999, No. 48, Acts of 
Parliament, 1999 § I-1(3)(e). 
 82. The cost to renew a GI is 3000 rupees. The Geographical Indication of Goods (Registration 
and Protection) Rules, 2002, The First Schedule, 4A. Once approved, GIs and all producers and 
authorized users of the GIs are listed in a national register. Geographical Indication of Goods Act §II-
5–6. Registration lasts for ten years and is renewable “from time to time” for periods of an additional 
10 years. Id. § III-18. 
 83. Id. § III-11(2). 
 84. Geographical Indication of Goods Rules § Form GI-1. 
 85. Geographical Indication of Goods Act § IV-21(1-b). 
 86. Id. § IV-24. 
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move? What rights do traditional weavers from Mysore have if they move to 
North India—or the U.K.?87 Of course, there are good reasons to prevent the 
alienation of the GI from the particular geographical community. It prevents 
the scenario in which a large foreign corporation hires a member of that 
community away and then begins to produce “authentic” work elsewhere, using 
that GI—and decimating the livelihoods of the traditional community left 
behind. At the same time, such a restriction could stifle opportunities for some 
individuals, as they remain within a traditional community by economic 
necessity, not choice. People move, intermarry, and change jobs. Culture flows 
with them. The GI Act does not recognize this dynamic nature of culture, 
ossifying authentic production in today’s localities. 
Within a recognized “association,” traditional leaders may impose their will 
on members, reifying traditional hierarchies.88 Elizabeth Povinelli notes that 
cultural rights often lead to the ironic production of authenticity or indigeneity, 
which conforms to traditional structures from the past, rather than celebrating 
cultures as diachronic peoples who are dynamic and heterogeneous.89 
GIs also pose economic concerns. While GIs protect Darjeeling tea, for 
example, they also prohibit the Indian manufacture of Scotch whiskey, driving 
up the cost of Scotch in India. It is possible that the poor may reap greater 
economic rewards in a system with fewer production constraints.90 Boyle’s 
concern about the public domain also applies; at which point does too much 
intellectual property impede the very processes of cultural sharing and 
innovation that law ought to promote, especially to aid the little guy in cultural 
production? These economic concerns raise an important question of liberal 
 
 87. See Liebl & Roy, supra note 53, at 65 (asking “[a]nd what happens when a weaver from 
another part of India moves to Kanjeevaram,” famous for its silk sarees?). 
 88. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 504 (2001) (urging assurance 
that “legal efforts to counter globalization and modernization do not buttress the hegemony of cultural 
elites and suppress efforts by cultural dissenters to gain autonomy and equality within their cultural 
context”); Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER, 
RACE & JUST. 69, 70 (2000) (discussing “the new centrality of struggles over discursive power—the 
right to create, and control, cultural meanings”); see Coombe, supra note 66. 
 89. See Elizabeth Povinelli, At Home in the Violence of Recognition, in PROPERTY IN QUESTION: 
VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 185, 185–206 (Katherine Verdery & Caroline 
Humphrey eds., 2004) (describing pressure on indigenous peoples to present their communities as “a 
synchronic structure” that comports to legal requirements for land based on colonial notions of 
authentic difference). See generally Rosemary J. Coombe et al., Bearing Cultural Distinction: 
Informational Capitalism and New Expectations for Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: ARTICLES ON CROSSING BORDERS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL AND ACTUAL 193, 193–213 (F. 
Willem Grosheide & Jan J. Brinkhof eds., 2005); Cristina Grasseni, Packaging Skills: Calibrating 
Cheese to the Global Market, in COMMODIFYING EVERYTHING: RELATIONSHIPS OF THE MARKET 259 
(Susan Strasser ed., 2003) (describing commodification of tradition in the context of local cheese 
production in Europe). 
 90. COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 90 (2002). Cf. Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Eat, Drink and 
Be Wary: Why the U.S. Should Oppose the WTO’s Extending Stringent Intellectual Property Protection 
of Wine and Spirit Names to Other Products, FINDLAW, Dec. 12, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ 
commentary/20021212_sprigman.html (highlighting free-speech concerns posed by heightened GI 
protection). 
06__SUNDER.DOC 8/8/2007  9:21 AM 
116 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:97 
strategy. As critical legal theorists have aptly warned, we must stand ready to 
openly question when and how “rights” might work to the disadvantage of the 
poor rather than to the poor’s benefit.91 
These concerns notwithstanding, GIs do potentially offer a range of 
benefits, from recognizing the innovation of collectives, to preserving 
geographic diversity and stimulating some redistribution of wealth. It may be 
more important to think of GIs as part of a larger framework in which the poor 
learn the secrets of Madison Avenue. If one simply produces goods, then any 
successful product will eventually draw stiff competition from global mass 
production. But creating a protected brand allows one to stave off complete 
usurpation by mass-produced substitutes. The GI Act works on this principle. It 
rewards the local community for having created a valued reputation and 
protects that reputation from the forces of global commerce. It recognizes that 
consumers everywhere seek authentic products and that they may care about 
who produces something, not just the ultimate product.92 Fair Trade coffee, 
Rugmark carpets, and dolphin-safe tuna, for example, appeal to people’s desire 
to consume free from the worry about exploitation in the process of production. 
In response to the commercialization of ghetto style by white-owned fashion 
houses, one African American company declares to the consumer its ghetto 
roots by branding itself “FUBU”—For Us, By Us. Such authenticity marks 
translate into profits in the marketplace. 
The goal is “to help poor people get along in the modern world—to use 
modern instruments for managing the ownership of knowledge either to collect 
on the commercial value of that knowledge or to prevent its use in a way that its 
owners consider inappropriate.”93 New organizations such as Light Years IP are 
emerging to address this need, specializing in marketing and branding a 
developing country’s intellectual property.94  
The Danish artists’ collective Superflex has pioneered this strategy. The 
Superflex “Supercopy” art collaboration employs what it calls a “counter-
economic strategy” to teach local farmers in the third world how to convert 
their biodiversity and traditional knowledge into branded end-products, which 
 
 91. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 334 (1997) (describing his own “loss 
of faith” in rights as always producing positive outcomes for the disempowered). Kennedy advocates a 
critical stance toward the discourse of rights but does not abandon rights altogether. Id. Cf. Daria 
Roithmayr, Left Over Rights, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1113, 1113–34 (2001) (arguing for pragmatic use of 
rights arguments by communities of color). 
 92. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the 
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 529 (2004) (noting that “consumer 
preferences may be heavily influenced by information regarding the manner in which goods are 
produced”). 
 93. Finger, supra note 54, at 3. 
 94. See generally Light Years IP, http://www.lightyearsip.net (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (recognizing 
that “within the last two decades, intellectual property has rapidly become the central means to create 
wealth in almost all industries,” and that “[t]here is an urgent need to increase knowledge and 
capability in developing country producers, exporters and government managers in the tasks of 
assessing intangible value opportunities, identifying IP solutions and implementing them.”). 
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will eventually compete with the products of global multinationals. In one 
ongoing collaboration, Superflex works with a farmers’ cooperative in Maues, 
Brazil. This region in the Amazon is famous for cultivating the guarana berry, 
prized by the local population for its perceived medicinal and energy-giving 
properties. The Dutch multinational Ambev and Pepsi Co. have successfully 
marketed global energy drinks derived from this plant, most notably Ambev’s 
“Antarctica” drink. The local Maues farmers complained that the 
multinationals have formed a cartel, driving down the price of the guarana 
berries from $25/kilo to $4/kilo. So the cooperative is fighting back. In 
collaboration with Superflex, farmers held brainstorming sessions to begin 
developing their own product and designing a label for it. One member, for 
example, suggested a coffee drink called Maues Café, evoking the 





Figure 1. Maues Café 
 
Eventually, the cooperative decided to manufacture and distribute a soft 
drink: Guarana Power. Members designed a label for the drink, which 
comprises a photograph of local farmers affixed atop the familiar Antarctica 
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label. Guarana Power’s marketing slogan? “[O]riginal Maues guarana for 
energy and empowerment.”  See Figure 2. 
 
 
Photo by Jeppe Gudmundsen-Holmgreen 
 
Figure 2. Guarana Power, with logo pasted over multinational brand label 
 
The Superflex collaboration turns on a simple idea: empowerment for the 
poor will entail the poor learning to control and market their own knowledge 
products. In the words of Superflex (appropriated from Ani DiFranco): “Every 
tool is a weapon if you hold it right.”95 The Maues collective spoke with lawyers 
about intellecual property rights, raised capital, paired with a production 
company in Denmark, and searched for global distributors for Guarana Power.96 
Superflex’s Guarana Power gallery floor reproduces the shop floor, taking 
visitors on a journey from producing to bottling, labeling, refrigerating, and 
tasting Guarana Power. 
 
 95. Jennifer Allen, Superflex: Rooseum—Reviews: Amsterdam - Bjornstjerne Reuter Christiansen, 
Jakob Fenger, and Rasmus Nielsen, ARTFORUM, Feb. 2003, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m0268/is_6_41/ai_98123170 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
 96. Anupam Chander, Illegal Art? The Artists’ Group Superflex Co-Opts Global Trademarks, 
FINDLAW, May 13, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20040513_chander.html; Anupam 
Chander, Guaraná Power to the People, SUPERFLEX.NET, May 2004, http://www.superflex.net/ 
guaranapower/main.php?page=strategy&id=2. 
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IV 
LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 
“Without ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must look well beyond it.” 
-Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom97 
In October 2004, the WIPO General Assembly declared that intellecual 
property law needs to incorporate a “development agenda.”98 WIPO responded 
in part to the Geneva Declaration, a call from hundreds of scientists, scholars, 
and activists to reorient intellecual property law in favor of the “[l]ong-
neglected concerns of the poor, the sick, the visually impaired and others.”99 
Consider too this handful of major intellecual property conferences in the first 
four months of 2006: Access to Knowledge at Yale Law School; a Michigan 
State conference on human rights issues in international intellectual property; 
this very conference on cultural environmentalism hosted by Stanford; and a 
conference on “Intellectual Property and Social Justice” at my own law school 
at the University of California, Davis. All these gatherings sound the same 
theme: that intellecual property law must confront its vast social effects and 
serve a broader range of human values. 
But when Boyle wrote Shamans, Software and Spleens, law-and-economic 
analysis was hegemonic in the legal academy. Accordingly, Boyle defended 
cultural environmentalism on a utilitarian metric. Today, it is increasingly 
evident that utilitarianism fails as a comprehensive theory of intellectual 
property, either descriptively or prescriptively.100 Neither economic nor legal 
scholars can make economic sense of the most important intellecual property 
cases of our generation, from Eldred v. Ashcroft101 to Grokster v. MGM.102 
Meanwhile, technological advances, including the World Wide Web itself,103 
undermine utilitarian intellecual property law’s very premise: that intellecual 
 
 97. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 14 (1999). 
 98. General Assembly Decision on a Development Agenda, Oct. 4, 2004, available at 
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/wipo10042004.html. 
 99. Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Oct. 2004, 
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf. 
 100. See Sunder, supra note 80. 
 101. 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see id. at 254 (saying of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, “no 
one could reasonably conclude that copyright’s traditional economic rationale applies here”) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); id. at 257 (“in respect to works already created . . . the statute creates no economic 
incentive at all”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 263 (“There is no legitimate, serious copyright-related 
justification for this statute.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, Amicus Brief of 
George A. Akerlof, Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., filed May 20, 2002, at 2 (statement of leading economists, 
including five Nobel Laureates, arguing that “[t]he term extension for existing works makes no 
significant contribution to an author’s economic incentive to create”). 
 102. 545 U.S. 125 (2005); see also Sunder, supra note 80 (arguing that Grokster turned on the 
common-law principles of fairness and morality, not economic efficiency). 
 103. See generally TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB (1999) (recounting Berners-Lee’s 
successful effort to convince his employer, CERN, to forgo intellecual property rights in his invention). 
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property rights are necessary to incentivize creation.104 The expansion of 
intellecual property law to the developing world through TRIPS and bilateral 
agreements has paradoxically weakened, rather than strengthened, the 
utilitarian understanding of intellectual property: we now know that many poor 
nations lack the infrastructure and resources required to create and 
commercialize their own knowledge.105 
So we must now think beyond incentives, but to what? The preamble to 
TRIPs stipulates that intellecual property rights must promote “development,” 
but it leaves that concept undefined. For the United States, establishing 
intellecual property law is itself development—such law will attract foreign 
direct investment and spur indigenous creation. 
But many see this understanding of development as much too narrow.106  
Demands to expand the ambit of values served by intellectual property abound. 
Artists and students around the world are joining in a “Free Culture” 
movement. Indigenous peoples complain of the ransacking of their cultural 
knowledge and environment. HIV–AIDS activists work to secure access to life-
saving medicines for the world’s poor. Farmers demand the right to replant 
seeds. Cultural environmentalists seek to preserve biodiversity and cultural 
communities. There is growing consensus that intellecual property law ought to 
have a “development agenda,” but not much agreement yet about what such a 
broad agenda for intellectual property and development would require. 
We have already been here: Recall the brilliant move made by Mahbub Ul 
Haq fifteen years ago when he fashioned the Human Development Report for 
the United Nations. That report countered the earlier dominance of GDP-
 
 104. The question is by no means new. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A 
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, HARV. L. REV. 281, 281–82 (1970) 
(suggesting that a working wage, possibly supplemented by government subsidies for expressive works, 
may be sufficient incentive for sufficient expressive works). 
 105. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 90, at 22 (2002) (“[I]n most 
low income countries, with a weak scientific and technological infrastructure, IP protection at the levels 
mandated by TRIPS is not a significant determinant of growth. On the contrary, rapid growth is more 
often associated with weaker IP protection.”); Peter Drahos, Introduction, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 1 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne 
eds., 2002) (“[G]lobal intellectual property rules may well be an obstacle to development.”); Martin 
Khor, Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights and TRIPS, in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: KNOWLEDGE, ACCESS AND DEVELOPMENT 201, 205 (Peter Drahos & Ruth Mayne eds., 
2002) (“The one-size-fits-all, or rather one-standard-fits-all, approach of TRIPS is a great disservice to 
developing countries.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Elaboration of Issues, supra note 26, ¶ 21 (clarifying “that the development dimension 
of intellectual property is NOT the same thing as technical assistance.”). An Indian representative to 
WIPO put it this way: 
'Development’ in WIPO’s terminology means increasing a developing country’s capacity to 
provide protection to the owners of intellectual property rights. This is quite the opposite of 
what developing countries understand when they refer to the ‘development dimension’. . . . 
The real ‘development’ imperative is ensuring that the interest of Intellectual Property owners 
is not secured at the expense of the users of IP, of consumers at large, and of public policy in 
general. 
Inter-Sessional Intergovernmental Meeting on a Development Agenda for WIPO, Statement by India, 
IIM/1 (Apr. 11–13, 2005) 
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based evaluations of social welfare. It built a positive measure of development 
from a number of disgruntled constituencies. Amartya Sen describes Mahbub 
Ul Haq’s strategy as shaping the negative energy of these multiple 
constituencies into a single, positive vision: 
Mahbub [Ul Haq] took on the leadership of large armies of discontent that were 
gunning, somewhat sporadically, at the single-minded concentration on the GNP. 
There were activists arguing for the recognition of ‘basic needs’. There were 
international interventionists lamenting ‘the state of the world’s children’. There were 
relief organizations concerned with hunger and epidemics. There were writers 
focusing on ‘disparities’ between the actual lives of the rich and the poor. There were 
humanists voicing the need for social justice in the quality of life. There were 
advocates of measures of physical quality of life. There were even some 
philosophically oriented critics wondering about the bigger insights into social ethics 
provided in the far-reaching works of Aristotle, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and even of 
John Stuart Mill. It is to the credit of Mahbub’s integrating vision that he saw the 
possibility of harnessing these different discontents into the development of a 
capacious alternative outlook which would be, at once, both practical and broad, and 
which could accommodate—however roughly—these different concerns.107 
Since 1990, the United Nations has understood development in the broad 
terms of expanding human capabilities, thanks in no small part to Sen himself. 
Ul Haq’s Human Development Report and Sen’s vision of “development as 
freedom” are pluralist, measuring development based on the capacity for many 
freedoms, including, but not limited to, market-oriented freedoms. These 
freedoms range from basic needs, such as the right to life and health, to more 
expansive freedoms of movement, creative work, and participation in social, 
economic, and cultural institutions.108 Furthermore, Sen’s theory recognizes the 
interrelatedness of rights: the right to labor and remuneration for one’s 
creations, including intellectual creations, affects the right to health, and vice 
versa.109 
Intellectual property law is essential to development, not just in the narrow 
sense of efficiency but in this broader view of expanding capability for central 
freedoms. Surely, copyrights and patents determine our access to basic needs, 
from educational materials to life-saving medicines. What is less obvious is that 
failure to be recognized as an author or inventor may impede one’s access to 
these essential life goods by diminishing one’s material wealth and the 
capability for living a full life. Stated differently, the implications in intellectual 
property rights go well beyond incentives for innovation; these rights are 
related to questions of cultural relations, social development, and GDP growth. 
As a new study by the National Commission on Women in India shows, 
intellecual property laws even implicate physical security. The Report argues 
that TRIPs, which recharacterized women’s farming knowledge as “raw 
 
 107. Amartya Sen, A Decade of Human Development, 1 J. HUMAN DEV. 17, 21 (2000). 
 108. See generally SEN, supra note 97. 
 109. Id. 
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materials” for corporations to appropriate, has reduced women’s profits and led 
to a corresponding rise in violence against women.110 
The traditional utilitarian understanding of intellectual property focuses on 
incentivizing the creation of more knowledge goods. Boyle’s shaman would 
preserve a rich public domain in order to promote this goal. But utilitarianism 
does not ask who makes the goods or whether the goods are fairly distributed to 
all who need them. A broader understanding of intellectual property recognizes 
the importance not just of producing more knowledge goods, but also of 
participating in the process of knowledge creation. Recognizing people’s 
humanity requires acknowledging their production of knowledge of the world. 
The United Nations’ conception of a “Knowledge Society” articulates this in 
terms of the products and processes of knowledge creation. In the Knowledge 
Age, social, cultural, and economic freedom will require not only access to 
knowledge products, but also access to the processes of creating knowledge. As 
a U.N. report puts it, “the Knowledge Society is not only about technological 
innovations, but also about human beings, their personal growth and their 
individual creativity, experience and participation . . . at its best, the Knowledge 
Society involves all members of a community in knowledge creation and 
utilization.”111 The principal assets of a Knowledge Society are “information . . . 
that triggers people’s creative reflection” and “people . . . as creative beings and 
carriers of tacit knowledge.”112 
Recognizing access to knowledge as consisting in both products and 
processes is essential as we craft a “development agenda” for intellectual 
property.113 We may ask first, How might intellecual property law enhance 
access to knowledge products—such as, for example, by not making textbooks 
and pharmaceuticals cost prohibitive to people who live on two dollars a day? 
One such mechanism is the “developing nations license,” a Creative Commons 
license that allows copyright holders to distribute their work freely in the third 
world, but demand market prices in the developed world. Similarly, the draft 
Treaty on Access to Knowledge would permit countries where urgently needed 
medicines are unaffordable at market prices to temporarily distribute these 
medicines at cost for “compassionate use.”114 Both the developing nations 
 
 110. INDIAN NAT’L COMM’N FOR WOMEN, IMPACT OF WTO ON WOMEN IN AGRICULTURE: A 
REPORT BY RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & ECOLOGY (2005). 
 111. U.N. Div. for Pub. Admin. & Dev. Mgmt., Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, Report: 
Understanding Knowledge Societies, xi, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/PAD/SER.E/66 (2005). UNESCO, for 
example, emphasizes the importance of both “access to information” and “capacity building.” 
UNESCO’s focus on the latter consists of “providing people with the skills and abilities for critical 
reception, assessment and use of information in their professional and personal lives.” UNESCO 
Home Page, http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=19487&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_ 
SECTION=201.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). 
 112. U.N. Div. for Pub. Admin. & Dev. Mgmt., Dep’t of Econ. & Social Affairs, supra note 111, at 
xi. 
 113. This discussion is adopted from Sunder, supra note 80. 
 114. TREATY ON ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE, supra note 35, at art. 4(1)(b)(iv). 
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license and the draft Treaty provision act as mechanisms for wealth distribution 
from the richer to the poorer parts of the world. 
At the same time, we must consider how intellecual property law and policy 
may enhance the capacity for participating in the processes of knowledge 
creation. The Indian GI Act, for example, recognizes the poor as producers of 
knowledge and promotes their participation in global markets. Rather than focus 
just on the reception of knowledge goods, the GI Act—and a vast campaign by 
NGO’s to teach poor people about it—focuses on teaching people how to 
recognize and market their own knowledge production. The GI Act takes an 
“agent-oriented” view of development, recognizing that “[w]ith adequate social 
opportunities, individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each 
other.”115 These individuals “need not be seen primarily as passive recipients of 
the benefits of cunning development programs.”116 
Focusing on development as freedom and agency also gives us a metric upon 
which to assess the Indian GI Act. For one thing, a geographical indication 
works by denying many the ability to identify a good by a particular name. But 
in so doing, it recognizes the quality and reputation cultivated by particular 
communities, and, like traditional trademarks, prohibits others from free-riding 
off that reputation. It thereby empowers local communities, which can continue 
to commercialize their products without fearing displacement by global mass 
production. Of course, GIs might circumscribe freedom if those within the 
community are forced to play defined roles in the production process or are 
prevented from leaving. As Sen writes, an economy premised upon agency and 
freedom will value “free labor contract and unrestrained physical movement” in 
contrast to the “bonded labor and forced work” characteristic of traditional 
economies.117 A core value in Sen’s development-as-freedom approach is that 
“the people must be allowed to decide freely what traditions they wish or not 
wish to follow.”118 
To be sure, this broadened understanding of intellectual property may 
require the recognition of new intellecual property rights, awarding private 
control over resources once thought to be in the public domain.119 For this 
reason alone, some may be tempted to reject new rationales for intellectual 
property. That this vision does not fit comfortably into the Originalist view of 
intellectual property, however, does not mean we should dismiss it. Ten years 
ago, Boyle boldly stated that our intellecual property system was not working. 
 
 115. SEN, supra note 97, at 11. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 28. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Of course, understanding the importance of access to knowledge, in the form of both products 
and processes, will also provide new rationales for limiting intellecual property rights. For example, 
compulsory licenses for third-world development of life-saving drugs enhance the public domain, at 
least when the public domain is understood as “[r]esources for which legal rights to access and use for 
free (or for nominal sums) are held broadly.” Chander & Sunder, supra note 39, at 1338. 
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Now, we must confront the fact that the utilitarian theory of intellectual 
property, without more, is not working. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The poor must be recognized as both receivers and producers of knowledge. 
Failing to promote poor people’s capacity for creative work and their 
participation in global culture and commercial markets hinders development as 
freedom. As Sen writes, “the rejection of the freedom to participate in the labor 
market is one of the ways of keeping people in bondage and captivity.”120 In the 
Knowledge Age, wealth lies not simply in access to other people’s knowledge 
(although this is certainly important), but also in the ability to produce new 
knowledge and to benefit from this creation, culturally and economically. 
 
 120. SEN, supra note 97, at 7. 
